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Abstract The purpose of this study is to formalize the optimal choice of market
entry strategy for an individual multinational enterprise (MNE) from a dynamic
perspective. It is argued that incorporating a suitable treatment of irreversibility,
uncertainty and ﬂexibility related to a MNEs investment decision gives further
insights to the expansion, dissolvement, and optimal timing of international joint
ventures (IJVs). In most cases, the initial entry strategy serves as a platform
allowing the ﬁrm to make subsequent investments to exploit host-country advan
tages and capabilities. We allow for this by taking a three-step expansion strategy
explicitly into account. The evolutionary process of the value of the foreign direct
investment can be interpreted as a compound complex chooser option. The results
suggest that uncertainty, size of equity share and future investment/divestment
opportunities play an important role when it comes to transit from export to the
ﬁrst phase of the foreign direct investment commitment. The paper underscores
the importance of modeling the dynamics of market entry and helps to reﬁne
the application of real options in the alliance context by providing a closed-form
solution in continuous time to value the overall strategic ﬂexibility.
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The decision on how to enter a foreign market has become crucial to an in-
ternationalizing ﬁrm (see e.g. McCarthy and Puﬀer 1997). Besides all other
market entry modes and a perceived decline in 2001, worldwide foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) continues to grow stressing the importance of equity
based entry strategies. In this context, uncertainty puts a premium on ﬂexi-
bility which results in the fact, that multinational enterprises (MNEs) often
prefer the formation of collaborate ventures, e.g. equity ventures or strategic
alliances when entering a foreign market for the ﬁrst time. This is due to sev-
eral reasons. The early stage of an international joint venture (IJV) provides
important information, e.g. about true market demand, certain governmental
or cultural behavior. Such information is important because it could not have
been obtained through investigation before the venture was initiated making
export strategies a clear initial favorite. On the other hand, an IJV provides
an opportunity to buy more fully into a successful venture later on, an oppor-
tunity which is not available to those who have not taken any equity stake.
As a consequence it avoids the more modest set-up costs of wholly owned
subsidiaries (WOS).
A joint venture (JV) is an agreement of two or more legally independent
companies, which pool their capabilities and resources together to a shared
business. The joint venture becomes an international joint venture if at least
one foreign partner is involved. The joint aspect is that ownership and risk are
shared, whereas the venture term implies separate legal and/or economic per-
sonality of the created enterprise.1 The economic rational of an international
joint venture is thus, that it allows both of the partners to acquire some of the
2beneﬁts of internalising the knowledge ﬂow which is in addition economically
justiﬁed if some complementary resources exist (e.g. Buckley and Casson 1996,
Contractor and Lorange 1988, Chi and McGuire 1996).
So far, models of the multinational enterprise have been too static and thus fail
to take proper account of uncertainty that is created by the volatility in the
international business environment. Consequently, ﬂexibility was identiﬁed as
the hallmark of modeling the multinational ﬁrm (Buckley and Casson 1998b
p.21). In particular, there exists a lack of in-depth research in the MNE liter-
ature, and in the international business literature respectively, with respect to
the following questions. First, what triggers the switching of modes and sec-
ond under which circumstances does the ﬁrm expand or dissolve international
joint ventures from a dynamic viewpoint? A third question arises from the
search for an optimal degree of foreign ownership since MNEs have frequently
to decide to own 100%, majority or minority shares of newly created foreign
entities.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed. Section two will provide a review
of recent literature, following the presentation of the model in the subsequent
section three. After this, the main results are presented in the fourth section. A
synopsis of major comparative-static results is provided in section ﬁve. Finally,
section six summarizes the main ﬁndings and provide suggestions for further
research.
32 Review of the Literature
Most studies in the ﬁeld of IJV driven research is empirical in nature (e.g.
Dimelis and Louri 2002, Henisz 2000, Culpan and Kostelac 1993, Geringer and
Herbert 1991, Gatignon and Anderson 1988 or Gomes-Casseras 1987). Less
eﬀort, however, has been made in scrutinizing the properties of IJV through
rigorous theoretical modeling. Buckley and Casson (1996) present a discrete
choice model that explains the formation of IJVs in terms of key explanatory
factors suggested by internalization theory, e.g. cultural distance, economies
of scope and protection of independence. In addition, the authors discuss the
strategic interactions between IJVs and merger on the one hand, and IJVs and
licensing on the other hand. Although static in nature the model accounts for
volatility as a proxy for pace for innovation and rate of interest. Thus, they
argue that IJVs are present in situations where market size and volatility
are both either high or low. In a qualitative manner, Buckley and Casson
(1998a) focused explicitly on determinants inﬂuencing the choice between al-
ternative forms of foreign direct investment. They stress the importance of
certain additional costs that trigger the choice of preferring IJV with respect
to other forms like e.g. greenﬁeld or acquisition. In particular, the authors
identify learning costs, adaptation costs and trust-building costs, i.e. those
for technology transfer, marketing expertise and intermediate output ﬂow, as
important once-and-for-all set up cost for IJVs. However, all attempts do not
account for the fact, that a ﬁrms commitment to invest into a new market is
associated with sunk costs which cannot be recovered once the project is ini-
tiated. Furthermore, foreign direct investment decisions are to a large portion
investment decisions under uncertainty and are only but the ﬁrst commitment
4of subsequent expansion. Thus, with respect to the initial switching decision,
i.e. whether to abandon export or not, one has additionally to consider the
impetus of subsequent expansion. Another criticism stems from that fact, that
these models only consider the unidirectional case. Thus, they lack explana-
tion of divestment or strategic reorientation (see e.g. Buckley and Tse 1996
and Buckley and Casson 1998a, Kogut and Zander 1993).
In the last decade, researchers have highlighted the importance of a more
dynamic perspective in foreign direct investment (FDI) theory. Real options
theory has recently generated signiﬁcant interest in the international business
ﬁeld. In brief, real option theory suggests to view real investments as options
buying the ﬁrm the rights such as to make investments later, the right to defer
or alter scale or to initiate subsequent investments.2 Besides others, Buckley
and Casson (1998b) have drawn the attention on this by arguing that the ex-
isting models do value FDI decisions only with respect to its immediate eﬀects
rather than in terms of possible new investment opportunities. In other words,
in most cases initial foreign production serves as a platform in the expansion
abroad, e.g. MNEs R&D units, indicating that the initial investments carry a
high option value due to possible new investment opportunities (Kogut and
Chang 1996, Howells and Wood 1993, Chang and Rosenzweig 2001, Lukas
and Gilroy 2005). It is clear that this fact is most obvious for international
joint ventures and it is Kogut (1991) who puts this thought further. Possible
project interdependencies within the IJV allow for strategic ﬂexibility calling
for a interpretation of IJVs as platform investments. Thus, although unprof-
itable from a stand-alone perspective, the value of a joint-venture can be much
higher due to the ﬂexibility to acquire later stakes of the venture in the fu-
ture. Consequently, the termination of a IJV does not indicate its failure but
5the exploitation of its ﬂexibility. Lately, his idea has become a building block
for empirical research (see e.g. Reuer and Leiblein 2000 or Reuer and Tong
2005). Based on a two-stage binomial model, Chi and McGuire (1996) model
a situation in which the MNE has the option to acquire or sell out the part-
ner’s stake in an equity JV.3 They depict that both options create economic
value for the partners of the JV, especially if the partners foresee diﬀerent
valuation expectations of the venture ex post. In addition, the presence of
transactions costs can lead to a certain amount of ex ante asymmetry which
results in the motivation to trade in the right to the option. By treating two
sources of uncertainty explicitly in their model, the authors were also able to
show how the options serve in diminishing the risk of misappropriation and
thus alleviating the diﬃculty of JV contracting under information asymmetry.
Besides the theoretical analysis, the authors also present a number of testable
hypotheses related to their work. In a more advanced model setting, Pennings
and Sleuwaegen (2000) design an option model where both the timing of mar-
ket entry and the entry mode are determined simultaneously. The switch from
export whether to a WOS, a joint venture or to licensing is dependent on
uncertainty of payoﬀs, cost structure, competitive stance of incumbents, tax
diﬀerences and the degree of cooperation between the joint venture partners.
In particular, the timing of JV is related to transfer prices, amount of equity
share, market structure, and to the degree of governmental regulation.
Over and beyond the attempts of the current literatures, the goal of this pa-
per is twofold: To model a market entry situation of foreign direct investment
under uncertainty in a continuous time setting given the observed fact of an
evolutionary expansion sequence via an IJV. Thus, the rest of the paper is
structured as followed. First, we will present the model: a three-phase mar-
6ket entry situation where each phase is connected to some sort of sunk cost
and the ﬂexibility to decide whether to initiate the phase or not. The ﬁrst
phase represents the initial phase of an international joint venture, e.g. the
establishment of a physical presence by either holding minority, majority or
an equal stake of the collaborative venture. This phase serves as a platform,
i.e. an important prerequisite to further expand an MNEs presence in the new
market. After a second phase of joint collaboration, the third phase is linked
to two options. The ﬁrst is to expand the foreign commitment by acquiring
the remaining shares and transform the market entry into a merger. The coun-
terpart option is to dissolve the venture by selling out the partner. Finally, we
will discuss our main ﬁndings.
3 The Model
IJVs are conﬁgured in many diﬀerent ways. Consequently, diﬀerent combina-
tions are associated with diﬀerent kinds of behavior (see e.g. Tallmann 1992).
The complexity of IJVs is furthermore driven by the fact, that not only eco-
nomic factors such as proﬁt or market-share have an impact on IJVs but
other factors like e.g. legal, technological and cultural factors (e.g. Geringer
and Hebert 1989, Contractor and Lorange 1988, Hennart 1988). Thus, ex-
plicit assumptions are particularly crucial when modeling an IJV. This paper
focuses on a representative equity-based joint venture between two private
ﬁrms that combine complementary resources. These resources comprise ﬁrm-
speciﬁc knowledge, which is either related to technology or marketing expertise
or both. For simplicity it is assumed, that the ﬁrms only share a subset of their
overall knowledge, however in an amount that secures the agreed objective,
7such as e.g. the solution to a new product development. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that only one ﬁrm is a foreigner to the new market, namely the MNE
which choses a local partner in the host country.
Consider a MNE that has to decide whether to enter a new geographical
market via a joint venture with a host country candidate or sticking to its
current export serving strategy. 4 It is assumed that the foreign investor is
risk neutral and that market entry through foreign direct investment follows a
three stage process and that each stage is connected to some sort of sunk costs.5
The choice of which entry strategy an enterprise chooses has no inﬂuence upon
the proﬁt rates of other enterprises in the foreign market. Moreover, the value
of the chosen FDI mode is ex ante unknown and follows a geometric Brownian
motion. Thus, dV (t) represents the value evolution of the foreign investment
project:
dV (t)=αV (t)dt + σV(t)dB(t), (1)
with α as the corresponding growth rate of the project values, dB(t)r e p r e s e n t s
a Wiener process with zero mean and variance equal to dt and σ2 designates
t h ev a r i a n c eo fdV (t)/V (t) due to environmental risk. Assuming a perfect
capital market, the existence of a unique martingale measure Q can be used
to modify the stochastic diﬀerential equation, which results in:
dV (t)=(r − δ)V (t)dt + σV(t)dB
Q(t), (2)
where dBQ(t) is now a stochastic element with non-zero drift. We will use this
expression for any further consideration on the value of the claims.
During the ﬁrst stage of setting up an operation physical presence costs of the
8order of I1 emerge. With respect to Buckley and Casson (1998b) it is assumed
that this up front cost incurs additional costs of market entry that diﬀer with
respect to the chosen entry strategy. In particular, the authors identify learning
costs m, adaptation costs a and trust-building costs q, i.e. those for technology
transfer, marketing expertise and intermediate output ﬂow, as important once-
and-for-all set up cost for IJVs. Consequently, it is assumed that these costs
combined with the ex ante speciﬁed costs I0 for acquiring the equity stake χ
make of the set-up cost I1 which can be formulated more explicitly:6
I1 = η(a,q,m)I0. (3)
where η is an increasing function in the additional costs.
The ﬁrst phase represents the initial phase of an international joint venture,
e.g. the establishment of a physical presence by either holding minority, ma-
jority or an equal stake of the collaborative venture. Let χ refer to the initial
equity stake, the MNE investor wishes to invest in. Then the value of such a
market entry for the MNE is equal to:7
˜ F = E
Q
 




given the ﬁltration F0. ˆ F represents the value of ﬂexibility due to subsequent
routes of action.
Due to the fact, that an international joint venture involves co-ownership as
well as co-management, both partners are comprised to a risk that obstacles
to a smooth decision-making process will arise over the course of the project.
Consequently, it is worthwhile to consider a certain period of time in which the
partners become acquainted and can check if joint work is possible for the sake
9of the venture. We will designate this time with T. After this period, the MNE
can either decide to exercise the option to expand its foreign market presence
by acquiring the rest (1 − χ) of the equity stake. For simplicity, we assume
that the MNE will buy the remaining stake so the resulting equity becomes
1 and equals a cross-border merger. However, if the environment turns out
to be unproﬁtable, the MNE can dissolve the joint venture buy selling out
its stake to the partner. Thus, the venture will be an equity joint venture if
0.05 <χ<1 (see e.g. Gomes-Casseras 1987).
Formalizing the optimization problem in this manner is similar to the analyt-
ics of two ﬁnancial options; a compound option and a complex chooser option.
A compound options simply refers to option rights on options. The chooser
option, however, is a path dependent derivative which allows the holder to
chooser whether their option is a call or a put at a particular date. It is
worthwhile to note, that the methodological foundations and solution of this
optimization problem have been analyzed independently. The ﬁrst to analyze
a compound option was Geske (1979) while perpetual options have been stud-
ied by e.g. McDonald and Siegel (1986). Complex chooser options have been
analyzed by Rubinstein (1991). While they have been studied in isolation,
however, none of the existing literature have brought them into conjunction
so far.
It may be demonstrated that for each stage there exists a threshold value
at which it is optimal for a MNE to exercise the investment option.8 The
following section brieﬂy summarizes the trigger values which illustrate when
it is optimal for an MNE to trigger the ﬁrst, second, and third stage of the
market entry via an IJV.
104R e s u l t s
In the following the main ﬁndings resulting from the previous introduced as-
sumptions are summarized. It is worthwhile stating, that the solution of the
problem in general is determined recursively. However, it is convenient to
present the results in a forward looking fashion.
Proposition 1 The ﬂexibility for an individual MNE to enter the market via
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Proof 1 See Appendix.
11The ﬁrst two terms of the solution correspond with the Black-Scholes formula
and emphasise the value of waiting to invest. However, substantial contribu-
tion to the value of the IJV entry strategy stems from its subsequent ﬂexibility,
i.e. the option to choose. This ﬂexibility is composed of the option value to
dissolve the IJV (i.e. the third to ﬁfth term) and the option value to grow and
turn the IJV into a cross-border merger (i.e. the remaining terms) . As the
result indicates, the overall ﬂexibility of the entry strategy is besides uncer-
tainty, costs, amount of equity share and time additionally sensitive to several
threshold values which will be discussed in the following.
Neglecting exchange rate eﬀects and switching costs, an enterprise will aban-
don its current export service strategy if the value development for the foreign
direct investment strategy hits a certain threshold value V ∗
1 .9
Proposition 2 The MNE will switch from export to an international joint





1 + ˆ F(V
∗
1 ) − I1 =0 , (6)
with I1 as the initial investment cost and ˆ F as the ﬂexibility for further ex-
pansion or dissolvement.
Proof 2 See Appendix.
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Counterbalancing these costs an enterprise obtains the IJV with value χV
given it exercises the investment possibility. Exercising this option the initi-
ated project serves as a platform for a second investment opportunity putting
the ﬁrm in a position to accrue further potential growth. As noted earlier,
the expansion of multinational enterprises is a path dependent process, i.e.
expansion may be interpreted as a sequence of investments where each in-
vestment feeds back information that can be used to improve the quality of
subsequent decisions. (Kogut and Zander 1993). Consequently, the internal-
ization process is not a unidirectional path, often overlooked in international
business literature. A ﬁrm can anticipate the possibility of competition by in-
vesting in a manner that takes subsequent divestment options into account.
Thus, divestment or withdrawal must be considered as serious strategies, too.
We account for this by assuming that the MNE has a certain time period, in
which it can decide how to continue with its market entry strategy. At the
end of this period [t1,t 2], the MNE can decide whether it wants to convert the
IJV into a cross-border merger by acquiring the remaining shares (1 − χ)o r
dissolve the IJV by selling its own interest χ to the local partner. The last step
may be justiﬁed, because a subsequent innovation renders an existing part-
13ner’s technology obsolete or due to misappropriation risk. Consequently, the
venture is abandoned for the sake of a new venture or for withdrawal from the
foreign market. The criteria which strategy the MNE is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 After a certain time T of joint collaboration in the foreign
market, the MNE will continue to collaborate with the host partner in the







((1 − χ)V ∗
U − I2)(V ∗
U)−β1, (8)
with γ = β1 − β2. Otherwise, the MNE prepares to exit the market.
Proof 3 See Appendix.
If the MNE decides to expand into the market, it receives at t2 ap e r p e t u a l
call option. Let I2 represent the corresponding cost for acquiring the rest of
the equity stake (1 − χ) designating the cost of exercising the third stage
call option.10 By exercising the option the ﬁrm obtains a project with value
(1 − χ)V .
Proposition 4 Upon deciding to further expand into the foreign market, the
MNE will switch from an international joint venture to a cross-border merger,











Proof 4 See Appendix.
14On the other hand, if the MNE decides to dissolve the IJV, it will receive a
perpetual put option. Upon exercising the third stage, the MNE gives up an
existing project with value χV and receives its abandonment value κI0 with
0 <κ<1 designating the level of recovered upfront investment outlay I0 (see
e.g. Chi 2000).11
Proposition 5 Upon deciding to dissolve the international joint venture the
MNE will exit the foreign market, i.e. exercising the third stage, if V reaches










Proof 5 See Appendix.
5 Comparative-static Analysis
This section presents a summarization of a comparative-static analysis of the
derived individual stage trigger points. If not noted later on, we will assume
the following values I0 =1 ,I 2 =1 ,r =0 .03,σ =0 .3,δ =0 .03,κ =0 .8a n d
η = 1. Allowing for a collaboration period of length two years, i.e. T =2t h e
value of the ﬂexibility the MNE has to consider while planning to implement
the IJV will be discussed ﬁrst. From equation (5) it is apparent that the ﬁrst
two terms emphasize the value of waiting to invest. Thus, the comparative
statistics of this term are identical with the ones of the Black-Scholes formula,
e.g. ﬂexibility is more valuable the longer the possibility to defer the decision
exists. However, substantial contribution to the value of the IJV entry strategy
stems from its subsequent ﬂexibility, i.e. the value of the chooser option. This
ﬂexibility is composed of the option value to dissolve the IJV (i.e. the third
15to ﬁfth term) and the growth option value which reﬂects the value of the
subsequent cross-border merger strategy (i.e. the remaining terms). As the
result indicates, the overall ﬂexibility ˜ F of the entry strategy increases with
size of initial equity share, uncertainty, and value of the IJV while it decreases
for high initial costs. The eﬀect of the level of the divestiture price κ is twofold.
While for majority-owned IJV an increase in κ results in an increase of the
option value, and ﬂexibility respectively, the opposite can be observed for
minority-owned IJVs. Here, an increase in κ corresponds with a decrease of
the option value. The following Figure 1 summarizes the results graphically.
==========[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]===========
However, of special interest economically is the ﬁrst trigger point. It per-
mits inferences on the manner in which an enterprise enters a new market
based upon the initial equity χ and the corresponding market entry costs.
The threshold V ∗
1 decreases as uncertainty increases, thus indicating that a
switching of modes, i.e. from export to an IJV, will further be accelerated.12
In addition, the threshold becomes lower the higher the planned equity share
for the ﬁrst phase is. This eﬀect, however, is more obvious for high project
uncertainties. Due to the fact that a longer period of joint collaboration results
in a greater value of ﬂexibility ˆ F (Figure 2), V ∗
1 is furthermore decreasing as
T increases .
==========[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]===========
As equation (6) indicates, the threshold is furthermore sensitive to the addi-
tional costs of a IJV. V ∗
1 is negatively aﬀected (i.e. increasing) if e.g. cultural
diﬀerences result in high learning costs or high adaptation costs are persis-
tent. Moreover, another interesting result is apparent. While the threshold V ∗
1
16is signiﬁcantly sensitive to uncertainty if there is a high recovery value once
the IJV is terminated in the future (i.e. high κ), the sensitiveness vanishes if
there is a decrease in κ. Consequently, there exists an increased propensity
that the MNE’s option for initiating a IJV will expire worthless. Figure 3
below illustrates the trigger value for the ﬁrst stage of an international JV.
==========[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]===========
The comparative-static results for the trigger value V ∗
D,a n dV ∗
U respectively,
are well-known from the standard literature.13 The threshold value V ∗
U becomes
larger and so does the propensity to wait with turning the IJV into a merger,
the higher the costs of acquiring the remaining shares I2 are, and the smaller
β1 is. Given that ∂β1/∂σ < 1, it follows that an increase in involved aggregate
investment uncertainty leads to an increase in V ∗
U. In addition, the trigger value
is also dependent on the size of equity share χ. If the MNE holds already a
majority in the IJV, 1/(1− χ) becomes signiﬁcantly large, thus indicating an
increased propensity to wait before acquiring the remaining shares (i.e. higher
threshold value). However, due to the concavity of V ∗
U(σ), the eﬀect of χ and
I2 is more signiﬁcant the lower the aggregate uncertainty of the overall project
is.
The opposite can be observed for the trigger value of the divestment stage. Low
uncertainties correlate with a high threshold value. Due to the dependence of
β2 on σ, V ∗
D decreases as uncertainty increases. This eﬀect is further ampliﬁed,
the lower the initial equity share χ or the higher the fraction of recovery value
κI0 is. However, due to the convexity of V ∗
D(σ), the eﬀect of κ, χ,a n dI0 is
more signiﬁcant the lower the aggregate uncertainty of the overall project is. It
is worthwhile to mention, that for low project uncertainty σ both thresholds
17are close to the costs of the investment opportunities. The following ﬁgure
summarizes the results of both threshold values.
==========[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]===========
However, the chooser option is a path dependent derivative. Thus, implications
about the kind of termination the MNE chooses at time t2 can only be made
in conjunction with the threshold ξ. As noted earlier, at t2 the MNE chooses
that strategy, that gives the maximum return according to max{C(V ),P(V )}.
Consequently, if V2 is greater than ξ, the MNE will stick to its current strat-
egy and further collaborate until the above mentioned threshold V ∗
U is reached
turning it into a merger. If V2 is lower than ξ, the MNE will further collaborate
while at the same time prefer to dissolve the IJV. From the results derived,
ξ shows now two diﬀerent trends with respect to its dependence on project
uncertainty. If the MNE holds a majority in the IJV, the threshold increases
the higher the aggregate uncertainty is. Consequently, with increased uncer-
tainty there is a perceived trend toward sell out because the MNE demand a
higher project value for compensating the associated risks accompanied with
a merger strategy. For minority IJVs, however, ξ is inversely dependent on
project uncertainty. Thus, the chance for a subsequent merger is even greater
the higher the project uncertainty becomes. Furthermore, given the fact that
ξ is (not) reached, the propensity to initiate the investment (divestment) is
even faster the lower the uncertainty σ is (i.e. because only small upward
(downward) movements of V are needed to hit the corresponding threshold
value).14 Both trends are dampened by a decrease in recovery value κ.F i g u r e
(4) depicts graphically the dependence of ξ on uncertainty with respect to
diﬀerent κ,χ combinations.
18==========[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]===========
6 Summary
In this paper, we brieﬂy reviewed the recent empirical and analytic driven
literature concentrating on IJV. While most studies in this ﬁeld of research
is empirical in nature, less eﬀort, however, has been made in scrutinizing the
properties of IJV through rigorous theoretical modeling.
It is commonly known that the expansion of multinational enterprises is a path
dependent process which is reﬂected in the fact that the observed internaliza-
tion processes of MNE happened not only to be a unidirectional path. Conse-
quently, strategic reorientation, divestment or withdrawal must be considered
as serious strategies, too. In line with the demand toward a new agenda for
modeling the multinational ﬁrm, we present a real options model in a continu-
ous time setting given the observed fact of an evolutionary expansion sequence
via an IJV. By applying real options methodology, the impetus of subsequent
expansion can best be modeled. The model builds on the analytics of two ﬁ-
nancial options; a compound option and a complex chooser option. While they
have been studied in isolation, however, none of the existing literature have
brought them into conjunction so far. Thus, the consequent modeling of such
a derivate is another important contribution of the paper. It is demonstrated
that for each stage there exists a threshold value at which it is optimal for
a MNE to exercise the corresponding real option. The results show the new
complementary insight, that the choice of investing in the ﬁrst stage is not
only driven by the growth option, as commonly modeled in the literature, but
also driven by the ﬂexibility to dissolve the venture. In line with the empir-
19ical literature, e.g. Reuer and Tong (2005) this aspect becomes crucial when
high uncertainty, e.g. due to political risk, is persistent or if a majority-owned
IJV is considered. Another aspect provided by the model is that it explicitly
shows how the length of collaboration inﬂuences the path dependency of for-
eign direct investment, and the formation of IJV in particular. While it has
been commonly agreed on that IJV are a transitional form of foreign market
expansion, less emphasis has been placed on what triggers the choice of termi-
nation form. Consequently, the model provides a solution that allows to reveal
which kind of termination is chosen by the MNE. Moreover, implications for
governmental policies in order to attract FDI can be deduced from the model.
The model introduced here is a ﬁrst attempt to stress the sequential nature
of IJV and to depict the importance of subsequent investment/divestment op-
tions on the initial entry decision and their eﬀect on JV termination. This
model can be extended in a number of directions. While collaborating in the
foreign market, the MNE may proﬁt from learning. Consequently, some of the
uncertainty is resolved which can be implemented in the model easily. More-
over, real option rights are to a large extent not exclusive. Competition may
cause an erosion of the option value e.g. due to ﬁrst-mover advantage attempts
of potential competitors or due to misappropriation risks. In such a case, it
is worthwhile to extend the assumption that the value evolution of a foreign
direct investment follows a Brownian motion and to implement Poisson-Jump
arguments. Finally, the presented study provides new opportunities for further
empirical research under an option framework.
207 Appendix
The values of the investment opportunities ˆ F and ˜ F,a sw e l la st h eo p t i m a l
trigger points V ∗
U and V ∗
D (representing the actual timing of the subsequent
investment/divestment) may be solved for recursively. First, the values and
thresholds for the perpetual call and put option have to be determined. Then
the value of the second stage investment possibility ˆ F(V ), i.e. the complex
chooser option, along with the corresponding trigger point V ∗
1 are derived.
Finally, the value of the overall entry strategy ˜ F is speciﬁed.
7.1 Option values of the perpetual claims
From Dixit and Pindyck (1994) as well as Merton (1973) the results for a per-
petual call option, and a perpetual put respectively, are commonly known.15
Thus, they are just summarized brieﬂy. Building on the assumption of a mar-
tingale process, the corresponding value process of V is described by the fol-
lowing stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dVt =( r − δ)Vtdt + σVtdB
Q, (11)
where Q indicates the martingale measure. Under the assumption of a perpet-
ual time to maturity and corresponding boundary conditions the solution for
a perpetual call option results in:16
C(V )=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
AV β1 if V < V ∗
U









































σ2 > 0. (15)
Similar, the solution for a perpetual put option is given by:17
P(V )=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
BV β2 if V ≥ V ∗
D







































σ2 < 0. (19)
7.2 Closed-form solution for the complex chooser option
In order to derive a closed form solution for the complex chooser option one
has to determine another threshold ξ which is used to simplify the max{...}
22condition of the chooser option. Thus, ξ is derived by the intersection of P(ξ)








((1 − χ)V ∗
U − I2)(V ∗
U)−β1, (20)
with γ = β1 − β2.
Referring to the above stated results, the value of the chooser option is given
by:
ˆ F = e
−r(t2−t1)E
Q [max{P(V ),C(V )}]. (21)





















((1 − χ)V − I2)dΦ(V )].
where dΦ(V ) denotes the implied probability measure. The ﬁrst and the last
term of the integral are similar with the two parts of the Black-Scholes formula
and can be solved in the same manner. However, as both terms in the middle
are concerned, special attention is to the V β term. By applying Itˆ o’s Lemma












The last two terms of the exponential function can be substituted into a
stochastic process X ∼ N(−1/2σ2β2T,σ2β2T). Exemplarily, the solution is
































− rT as lower and upper bound-






−∞ f(x)dx, the integral can easily be solved. Finally, by sub-










1 N(d5) − AV
β1
1 N(d6)+( 1− χ)V1e
−δTN(d1) − I2e
−rTN(d2),
































































































7.3 Closed-form solution for the compound option
The solution of ˆ F is valid at time t1. However, if we want to know what value
the compound option has, we have to determine the value of this option at
24time t0. Thus, additionally one has to solve:
˜ F = E
Q
 




given the ﬁltration F0. The solution procedure is similar to the one provided





[χV + ˆ F − I1]e
rt1dΦ(V ), (29)
with respect to the given solution of the foremost closed-form solution for ˆ F.
The lower boundary V ∗




1 + ˆ F(V
∗
1 )=I1. (30)
This results in solving ten integrals and leads to the following expression for













0 M(h3,k 5;−ρ) − AV
β1






t1/t2, V0 states the value of the project at time t =0a n dM(...)
designates the bivariate cumulative standard normal distribution which is rep-















The expression of the cumulative standard normal and cumulative standard




























































































































































1One distinguishes between contractual and equity joint ventures: In a
contractual joint venture the initial investment costs, the risks and the proﬁts
of a single project are shared for a speciﬁed period, whereas in the latter assets,
risks, proﬁt and the participation of ownership in form of equity are shared
indeﬁnitely. The common endeavor can have any kind of minority-majority
structure or equity can be equally 50:50 relating to ﬁnancial, technological,
know-how contributions.
2A detailed introduction to real options is given by Trigeorgis (1998) and
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
3Although not explicitly stated, this model can be interpreted as a chooser
option, albeit only two discrete states are considered.
4It is taken for granted now, that an export strategy is the current preferred
strategy for the ﬁrm to internationalize.
5To simplify the analysis, we also assume that throughout the duration
of each stage the option rights are exclusive and furthermore that there are
no problems of forfeiture or expiration limits with regard to exercising the
respective investment option.
6For a ex post treatment see e.g. Chi (2000).
7This view is justiﬁed by the fact, that if the gains are always divided in
some ﬁxed proportion then the situation is identical with one ﬁrm taking the
active role (Buckley and Casson 1996 p. 873).
278The derivation of the threshold values are given in the appendix.
9For a discussion of exchange rate eﬀects as well as switching costs see e.g.
Kogut and Chang (1996). An interpretation of export strategy as a real option
itself available to a ﬁrm is given by e.g. Broll (1999).
10It is assumed that the acquisition price is ﬁxed right from the start. For
a justiﬁcation of this assumption refer to e.g. Beamish and Banks (1997) or
Chi and McGuire (1996).
11This assumption accounts for the fact that the additional costs cannot be
recovered.
12We will assume that the value of the current export strategy is indepen-
dent of uncertainty and can be represented by a simple net present value rule,
i.e. V − C>0.
13Compare Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
14The stylized facts with respect to the timing are consistent with the above
depicted comparative statistics of V ∗
U and V ∗
D respectively.
15There is a perpetual nature of foreign direct investment due to the fact
that legislation in most countries is such that no speciﬁc life span for a com-
pany is speciﬁed. See Clark (1997, p. 480). In cases where a speciﬁed contrac-
tual life span exist, the value of the foreign direct investment is a function of
time. Consequently, the value of the real option additionally depend on the
time left until the real option right matures.
16Compare Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.143 ﬀ.).
17Compare e.g. Merton (1990).
2818If there is not such a perpetual lifespan assumed, ξ has to be determined
iteratively, i.e. using Newton-Raphson or quadratic methods instead. See e.g.
Nelken (1993).
19See e.g. Geske (1979).
20Drezner (1978) provides an algorithm to solve the bivariate normal inte-
gral.
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Figure 1. Value of ﬂexibility in transitional IJV



























Figure 2. Value of acquisition/divesture option ˆ F with respect to V and
time of joint collaboration T.
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Figure 3. Threshold values of divesture V ∗
D(r,δ,σ,χ,κ,I2,I 0)a n da c q u i -
sition option V ∗
U(r,δ,σ,χ,I2) with respect to uncertainty σ.
xi(0.03, 0.03, s, 0.25, 0.8, 1, 1)
xi(0.03, 0.03, s, 0.75, 0.8, 1, 1)
xi(0.03, 0.03, s, 0.25, 0.2, 1, 1)
xi(0.03, 0.03, s, 0.75, 0.2, 1, 1)
















Figure 4. Inﬂuence of uncertainty σ and equity share χ on
ξ(r,δ,σ,χ,κ,I2,I 0).
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